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 30   Histories of humanitarian action in Sub-Saharan Africa 
4 Controlling sleeping 
sickness   amidst conflict 
and calm:   remembering, 
forgetting and   the 
politics of humanitarian   
 knowledge in Southern 
Sudan, 1956–2005 
  Jennifer J. Palmer and Pete Kingsley 
Introduction 
Sleeping sickness (human African trypanosomiasis) is a 
parasitic disease spread by the tsetse fly across a large 
belt of Sub-Saharan Africa. It is one of the great stories 
of success – and failure – of public health in the 
twentieth century. Nearly all conventional histories, such 
as those found in project proposals written by 
international organisations or in World Health 
Organisation (WHO) documents, begin by recounting the 
story of the disease’s ‘U-shaped’ curve on graphs 
depicting reported cases on the continent over time (see, 
for example, Simarro et al., 2008; WHO, 2013;   Ruiz et 
al., 2008; Figure 1, page 28). Although the curve takes 
different forms in individual endemic countries, this 
emblematic continental graph conveys a particular 
message about the history of this disease, which has had 
far-reaching consequences on how disease control is 
understood today.  
Sleeping sickness is often seen as a quintessential 
colonial disease (Lyons, 1992): with a continental peak 
of 60,000 cases in 1930, controlling the disease and its 
tsetse fly vector were core imperial priorities. Control of 
the most prevalent form of sleeping sickness, gambiense, 
was achieved through a succession of strategies 
involving coercive measures that reflected broader 
                                                          
1 Sleeping sickness control by colonial authorities in Southern Sudan 
has been reviewed by scientists involved in these colonial 
patterns of political domination: forced resettlement, 
denuding of land supporting tsetse, years-long 
internment of patients in isolation centres, treatment with 
extremely toxic medicines, punishments for chiefs that 
did not present their populations for medical inspection 
and mass prophylactic injections.1  Today, the most well-
known method from this period is medical inspection 
(now referred to as mass or active screening) by mobile 
teams operating in Central Africa. Designed by military 
physicians to achieve near 100% population coverage, 
this strategy worked so well, so the story goes, that 
Africa came close to eliminating the disease by the 1960s 
and found itself at the bottom of the ‘U’. The near-
success of elimination coincided with independence for 
many African states, however, and these new 
governments had other priorities, but also wanted to 
distance themselves from the coercive practices 
associated with colonial methods (De Raadt, 2005). 
Control programmes thus collapsed. When sleeping 
sickness resurged to its second peak of over 30,000 
annual cases during the civil wars in Central Africa in the 
late 1990s, contemporary histories recount how medical 
humanitarian organisations, particularly Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF), were the only actors with sufficient 
interest and means to re-engage with the disease (Corty, 
2011). This second continental epidemic was 
successfully controlled, again via mass  
programmes (Maurice, 1930; Bloss, 1960) and by historians since 
then (Bayoumi, 1979; Bell, 1999; Leonardi, 2005).  
   2 
Next?’, PLoS Med 5(2): e55.  
screening. Revitalising this strategy involved creating a 
global logistical supply chain to bring diagnostic tools and 
medicines which had been improved in the meantime from 
Europe to rebel strongholds in Angola, Sudan, Uganda, 
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and the 
Central African Republic. Whereas colonial public health 
programmes had struggled to secure compliance from 
recalcitrant African populations, for humanitarians the main 
struggle was with the pharmaceutical companies that 
produced the medicines needed to control this deadly but 
commercially unviable disease. But the lessons for history 
became clear: active screening is the best – indeed, the sole 
– strategy to control HAT in Africa. 
Whilst this general narrative makes a strong case to focus 
minds and resources for control, it also conceals various 
important heterogeneities and inconsistent logics in the 
sleeping sickness story from place to place and over time. 
This is a problem germane to disease control in Africa. 
Lessons from past disease control initiatives on the 
continent, despite their long history and large scale, have 
remained largely unarticulated  
or misconstrued and therefore unable to inform 
contemporary efforts (Webb and Giles-Vernick, 2013). 
Programme planners generally ‘have not sensed a first 
imperative to understand the worlds in which their 
projects would operate’, tending rather to assume that 
there was no need to do so because the disease was well 
understood biomedically (ibid.: 1). This failure to take 
socio-cultural and geographic contexts into account still 
plays a critical role in global health today. Given the 
essential role of humanitarians in controlling sleeping 
sickness in the most recent continental epidemic it is 
important that we clarify, with the benefit of hindsight 
and the space to do so outside of an outbreak and conflict 
situation, exactly how they selected disease control 
priorities from the range of different options available, 
and the assumptions on which that choice was based. 
Further, we ask how the era of humanitarian intervention 
marked a break from the colonial past, and what the 
continuities were. And, most importantly for the purposes 
of this collection of papers, what does the history of 
sleeping sickness reveal about the nature of humanitarian 
actors and their ability to carry out complex, long-term 
projects such as continental disease control?  
Figure 1: ‘U’-shaped epidemiological curve of sleeping sickness cases in 
Africa, 1927–97  
 
Source: Simarro, P. P., J. Jannin and P. Cattand (2008) ‘Eliminating Human African Trypanosomiasis: Where Do We Stand and What Comes  
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To explore these issues, we track the development of this 
story in a single place, Southern Sudan, over the period 
1956–2005. This case is chosen in part because it 
represents a ‘ground zero’ in terms of the dominance of 
humanitarian actors – Southern Sudan’s two civil wars 
(1955–72 and 1983–2005) meant that state capacity for 
health care and disease control was extremely limited 
throughout this period, leaving international agencies 
free to act with an unusually broad mandate. In theory, 
with the civil war beginning a year before independence 
in 1956, continuities between the colonial and 
humanitarian systems should be easier to identify in 
Southern Sudan. As well as being of historical interest, 
we believe that this case is significant for modern 
priorities. Since the end of the civil war in 2005, most 
humanitarian organisations have ceased their 
involvement in sleeping sickness control, leaving the task 
to a network of other types of global health actors. 
Although this paper does discuss the perspectives of 
those witnessing or receiving humanitarian assistance, it 
is not primarily an attempt to reconstruct a view of 
humanitarian actors ‘from below’. Such histories are 
valuable, particular as they offer a counterpoint to 
dominant humanitarian narratives. We believe however 
that the specificities of Southern Sudan require a 
different approach, not least as the fractured, multiactor 
nature of intervention in this country (formerly a region 
of Sudan) has meant that there may be less of a clear, 
dominant narrative to overturn. Instead, we identify 
which actors carried out what activities, and the reasons 
and assumptions that led them to pursue those strategies 
in an institutional and intellectual history of sleeping 
sickness in Southern Sudan. Understanding the decision-
making of dominant actors is central to a critical history 
of this period, and allows reflection on those ideas and 
histories which may have fallen out of favour, or been 
silenced or overlooked.  
We begin with an outline of the events of the colonial 
period, which prefigure in important ways the period 
under discussion. Whilst this period involved 
widespread use of coercive methods, there were also 
other more holistic strategies, in which medical and 
environmental approaches were combined, along with 
broader attempts to encourage agricultural 
development. The remainder of this paper traces trends 
in disease control through the three dominant 
organisations active in sleeping sickness here. The 
World Health Organisation (WHO) was the dominant 
actor in the 1950s – where it pursued a medical strategy 
that continued some colonial measures, but tended to 
ignore vector control. The suspension of conflict in the 
1970s provided WHO with a second opportunity to 
intervene, but its ambitious plans were thwarted by 
logistical difficulties. The Belgian  
Development Cooperation (1978–90) and MSF  
(1995–2005) then became active, particularly in 
experimenting with new forms of diagnostic tests and 
treatments. Significant successes were achieved with new 
medical tools and strategies, but again vector control 
remained largely neglected. 
To tell this story, we use substantial archival material 
alongside interviews with key individuals to reconstruct the 
history of sleeping sickness control in Southern Sudan. 
Specifically, we consulted the WHO archives on Sudan (for 
material covering the period 1926–95), the South Sudan 
national archives in Juba (1931–78), the Rift Valley 
Institute’s Sudan Open Archive (1860– 2009), Durham 
University’s Sudan Archive (1950–70),  
Tvedt’s 2004 annotated bibliography of Southern Sudan 
(1850–2004), the Belgian Development Cooperation’s 
archive (1978–91) and one NGO archive (Merlin 1996–
2010), as well as relevant academic literature. We 
supplemented this material with 18 interviews with experts 
familiar with the subject, mostly active or retired NGO 
workers and civil servants.  
Colonial sleeping sickness 
administration and 
resistance (1910–54) 
Sleeping sickness was most likely introduced to Southern 
Sudan in colonial times. Soldiers, labourers and traders are 
thought to have carried gambiense sleeping sickness from 
ancient endemic foci in West Africa into the Belgian Congo 
and then into the Lado  
Enclave and Uganda from the late 1880s (Lyons, 1992; Bell, 
1999; Morris, 1960). Based on extensive epidemics in 
neighbouring Uganda and Congo, sleeping sickness was 
feared by Anglo-Egyptian administrators and preventive 
control measures were implemented before any cases were 
detected. Border tours by British scientists in 1904–1905 
identified no human cases (Bayoumi, 1979; Bell, 1999), but 
medical inspection posts were nevertheless established at 
road and river borders in 1909 to turn away or quarantine  
   4 
dri and Kiri within Kajo-Keji. 
travellers. That year, cases of sleeping sickness were 
imported with soldiers through the Congolese border in 
Raga near Darfur, but without a tsetse vector capable of 
carrying this type of sleeping sickness in the area local 
transmission was never established (Bloss, 1960). It was 
only in 1910, after the AngloEgyptian government took 
control of part of the Lado Enclave containing the present-
day sleeping sickness foci of Yei and Kajo-Keji, where 
cases were thought to have occurred since 1885 (Bell, 1999), 
that Southern Sudan inherited an epidemic of sleeping 
sickness (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). Another sleeping 
                                                          
2 See WHO reports: Hutchinson, M. (1975) ‘Assignment report: 
trypanosomiasis in Southern Sudan’; Snow, W. (1983) 
‘Assignment report: Tsetse distribution and ecology in 
relation to sleeping sickness in Southern Sudan, May–June 
1982’, WHO archives SUD-MPD-005. 
3 Rhodesiense sleeping sickness. which mainly infects cattle. 
has been clinically suspected in several areas of Southern 
sickness focus at Nimule was brought into the country in 
1914 when colonial authorities adjusted the border east of 
the Nile for the express purpose of simplifying international 
medical governance of this riverine disease (Leonardi, 2005; 
Merkx, 2000). Sleeping sickness eventually spread with G.f. 
fuscipes tsetse  
to the margins of its existing habitat, incorporating Tambura, 
Yambio and Maridi to the north-west in  
1918, 1923 and 1941, respectively, and to Mundri, Torit 
and the outskirts of Juba in the 1970s as fuscipes habitat 
expanded north-eastwards during the first civil war.2, 34  All 
of these foci continue to yield cases today.  
Sudan at different points in history (Tambura during the 
colonial period, Akobo during the 1970s, Torit in the 1970s 
and 1980s and suburban Juba in 2010) (Abdel Gadir et al., 
2003; Adamson, 1978; Archibald and Riding, 1926; Baker, 
1974; Bell, 1999; Hutchinson,  
4 ; Leak, 1999; Mohammed et al., 2010; Picozzi et al., 2005; 
Ruiz et al., 2008; Snow, 1983). Apart from Akobo at the 
Figure 2: Map showing major sleeping sickness foci in Southern Sudan  
 
Source: Simarro, P. P. et al. (2010) ‘The Atlas of Human African Trypanosomiasis: A Contribution to Global Mapping of Neglected Tropical Diseases’, 
Int J Health Geogr, 9. 
Figure legend: Location of sleeping sickness cases from Southern Sudan (Western, Central and Eastern Equatoria States, which made up the greater 
Equatoria Province, as it was formerly known, in dark red) and neighbouring countries (in pale red). Spot diameters correspond to the approximate number 
of cases reported to WHO from individual villages between 2000 and 2009. While the relative numbers of cases from each sleeping sickness focus has 
changed with time, all foci established in the colonial period continue to yield cases today. Important minor foci include Source Yubu and Ezo within the 
larger Tambura area, Li Rangu and Nzara within Yambio, Ibba within Maridi, Lui within Mun- 
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As Southern Sudan represented the northern limit of 
gambiense-transmitting tsetse habitat in the continent, 
this region was typically viewed by British 
administrators as a place where concerted environmental 
and medical intervention could beat back the disease 
entirely, out of Sudanese territory (Bell, 1999; Morris, 
1961). Such intervention, however, would require much 
greater engagement with the south, beyond the existing 
reaches of the Anglo-Egyptian administration. Previously 
seen as economically insignificant and politically 
unstable, the threat of sleeping sickness is arguably what 
made the remote south of Sudan matter in Khartoum, 
drawing administrators ‘out of colonial enclaves and into 
the lives of local people’ (Bell, 1999: 29).  
During the first two decades of colonial control, 
measures were typically implemented as if they were 
military campaigns, reflecting the choices commonly 
implemented in countries where the epidemic was 
more advanced. Borders were closed, tsetse areas were 
mapped and whole populations were moved away from 
the most infested areas, typically onto roads cut for the 
purpose of sleeping sickness inspections. Historians 
have highlighted the coercive nature of these 
interventions, which involved forced inspections and 
                                                          
Ethiopian border, however, human cases have never been 
confirmed. 
the lengthy confinement of suspected patients (Bell, 
1999; Leonardi, 2005). Later, however, more 
consensual methods emerged. As the epidemic moved 
into the remoter, forested areas of Tambura and 
Yambio, where state resources were particularly 
stretched, treatment camps were transformed into self-
sustaining communities. Here, sleeping sickness 
patients were encouraged to move with their families, 
who could provide labour that was otherwise 
unavailable to the state to grow food for the increasing 
numbers of patients and to cut back tsetse habitat along 
the 10km stretch of river in the isolation area (Bell, 
1999). Perhaps most importantly for colonial 
administrators, these isolation centres provided an 
unprecedented opportunity for development of the 
South. Dubbed ‘model villages’, sleeping sickness 
control here allowed administrators to live alongside 
affected people, both to ‘know’ them, as anthropologist 
E. E. Evans-Pritchard sought to do (Evans-Pritchard, 
1937; Gilles, 1976), and to introduce modern systems 
of social organisation. Here, wage labour was 
introduced alongside large-scale agriculture, market 
trading, medicine and education – the kind of 
development previously only attempted  
Figure 3: Annual numbers of sleeping sickness cases detected in 
Southern Sudan, 1911–2010  
 
Figure legend: The four major outbreaks of sleeping sickness in Southern Sudan over the last century correspond with four main events: the spread of 
sleeping sickness throughout the continent in the early part of the twentieth century, an outbreak associated with a cotton scheme in Yambio in the 1950s, 
and then two more outbreaks which began ‘silently’ while civil wars curtailed control activities. The figure depicts only reported cases, with case 
detection limited by surveillance capacity, which differed over time. National case data from 1911–97 was taken from WHO (2000), 1998–2005 from 
WHO (2007) and 2006–2010 from WHO communication, presented with permission of the Ministry of Health of South Sudan. No cases were reported 
during 1984, but data on hospital admissions to Li Rangu hospital in the Tambura focus suggest that around 700 cases were identified there alone (El 
Rayah, 2003).  
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in places like the Gezira cotton scheme in the north. With 
their strong harvests and access to salt via colonial supply 
lines, these settlements were tolerated, and even attracted 
Zande people from across the Congolese border (Bell, 
1999). 
By 1937, a decade after the country’s first major epidemic, a 
relaxation in population control for sleeping sickness was 
justified in epidemiological, economic and environmental 
terms. The 1940 Sleeping Sickness Regulations introduced a 
system of medical passports so that border traffic was no 
longer prohibited altogether.4 Inspections were less frequent. 
Preparations began for a Southern cotton scheme around 
Yambio, which would necessitate opening up tsetse habitat 
for farming, overriding the sleeping sickness concerns of the 
previous three decades. For medical personnel who had any 
lingering fears, a new more efficient method of vector 
control had emerged in Kenya which promised to avoid the 
‘irksome restrictions’ on people’s lives that resettlement and 
inspections entailed (Bloss, 1960; Hunt and Bloss, 1945: 
57). This new ‘block clearance’ method involved clearing 
only small (800 x 200-yard) sections of tsetse habitat along 
rivers to confine flies’ flight to blocks which could be 
surveilled by boys paid to catch flies.5 Trials of the new 
method showed rapid and largescale fly suppression. They 
were even combined with a system of prophylactic suramin 
injections in an attempt at sleeping sickness elimination in 
Tambura and Kajo-Keji in 1937–41, but the drug was 
expensive and medical personnel argued that tsetse 
suppression would have a more sustainable effect on 
transmission.6  
This preference for environmental over medical methods of 
control was at odds with medical opinion in other 
gambiense-affected areas of Africa. By the 1950s, globally, 
sleeping sickness control was increasingly being discussed 
in terms of elimination because of the success of mass 
screening and treatment activities in neighbouring French 
Equatoria and West Africa (Buxton, 1949; Morris, 1961). 
Pentamidine was also being used prophylactically to protect 
people from transmission between screening rounds in 
French Equatoria and the Belgian Congo (Muraz, 1954).7  
As early as 1948, Southern Sudan was considered a 
promising site for future research on this strategy because of 
the robust hospital infrastructure that had been built up in 
endemic areas (Buxton, 1949). Thus, when a large-scale 
resurgence seemed inevitable in the new and economically 
important Yambio cotton scheme in 1954, even though the 
cause of the outbreak was framed in terms of increased 
contact with tsetse, medical inspections with 
pentamidisation emerged as the favoured intervention choice 
over tackling the vector (Bloss, 1960; Bayoumi, 1979).8  
The governments in Juba and Khartoum therefore asked the 
newly-formed WHO for an expert with pentamidisation 
experience.9   
WHO elimination ‘success’ 
and reconstruction failure 
(1955–78)  
As independence neared, mutinies erupted across  
Equatoria in 1955, igniting the first civil war (Gilles, 
1976). For sleeping sickness control, the external 
partnership brokered with WHO the year before to 
support pentamidisation was fortuitous. For one thing, it 
allowed the external financing of pentamidine 
administration on top of the medical inspections and 
treatment activities which the Anglo-Egyptian 
government had always financed, and guaranteed 
continued Sudanese government commitments via this 
international agreement. Second, through consultancies 
and formal positions in the WHO regional office, it 
allowed some of the departing British colonial 
administrators an avenue to return to Southern Sudan to 
see through the sleeping sickness control plans they had 
helped put in place. There were further examples, for 
better or worse, of the continuity of colonial 
arrangements from an earlier period. At WHO’s 
insistence, sleeping sickness programmes regained 
remarkable administrative authority in the name of 
disease control: Equatoria Province decreed that 
prophylactic injections were compulsory; chiefs  
4 See WHO reports: Hutchinson, M. (1975) ‘Assignment 
report: trypanosomiasis in Southern Sudan’; Snow, W. (1983) 
‘Assignment report: Tsetse distribution and ecology in relation to 
sleeping sickness in Southern Sudan, May–June 1982’, WHO 
archives SUD-MPD-005. 
5 Anonymous, ‘Annual report 1939: special report on 
sleeping sickness’, national archives EP 96.A.1. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Farrell (1954) ‘Sources Yubu annual report 1953/54’, 
Durham University Sudan Archive H. B. M Farrell collection, 
SAD.627/5/11-22.. 
8 This was also partly on the grounds that vector control 
would be more difficult to apply in Yambio than in Tambura or 
Kajo-Keji, because of the diffuse habitat. 
9 E. Haddad, ‘Trypanosomiasis control project Sudan: 
report on visit to Sudan 9 April–28 June 1955’, report to WHO, 
WHO archives Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan. 
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were instructed to prosecute in court those who did not 
attend inspections and conscript them into hospital 
labour; all government soldiers in the southern region, 
even those in non-endemic areas, received two rounds of 
pentamidine; and international borders were policed for 
anyone not yet been given pentamidine.10 Meanwhile, 
the vector control measures that had previously gone 
hand in hand with drug administration ceased. While 
those within Sudan had maintained to the end of the 
colonial period the idea that elimination would 
necessitate tsetse control, under international WHO 
leadership pentamidisation was selected as the sole 
strategy needed for both control of acute outbreaks and 
‘permanent’ control in areas with residual transmission 
(Haddad, 1955). 
By 1962, scientists at WHO’s first meeting of the Expert 
Committee on Trypanosomiasis declared 
pentamidisation a success, writing: ‘It can now be said 
with certainty that T. gambiense in the Sudan will be 
eradicated within a year’.11, 12   But while reported cases 
had indeed declined substantially, sleeping sickness was 
almost certainly not gone in 1963.13 WHO’s withdrawal 
of support that year was more likely related to the 
intensification of the Southern conflict and the 
dysfunctional postindependence politics in Khartoum 
(Cockett, 2010). With the consolidation of rebel 
movements in 1963, conflict in Equatoria became 
entrenched and expanded to the other Southern 
provinces. Simultaneously, large numbers of expatriates 
were expelled from the country, including many 
missionaries who had been providing the majority of 
non-governmental support to healthcare in the South 
(Cockett, 2010). After WHO’s withdrawal, Sudanese 
hospital staff continued sleeping sickness control as best 
they could with remaining stocks of medicine, but the 
ability to screen patients systematically largely 
collapsed.14  
 
When Sudanese President Jafaar Nimeiri switched 
allegiances to Western, and particularly US, actors in 1971, 
a peace agreement with the South swiftly followed, 
ushering in the country’s first full-scale, Western-led 
humanitarian response. Most scholars consider this moment 
as marking the emergence of welfare privatisation in 
Southern Sudan as Khartoum sought to contract-out social 
services to international agencies (Large, 2012; Johnson, 
2011). UN plans for rehabilitating the South after 17 years 
of war entailed funnelling $20 million in the first year alone 
to 180,000 refugees and 500,000 people displaced 
internally by the war. Faith-based organisations were 
influential in drawing global attention to a suspected 
resurgence of sleeping sickness at the end of the war.15  
This resurgence was in the same south-western area that 
WHO pentamidisation campaigns had focused on at the 
beginning of the war, but advocacy at this time did not 
frame the problem in terms of a failure of strategy. Rather, 
humanitarians focused on the urgent need to address the 
epidemic of ‘madness’ reported from ‘areas hard hit by the 
disturbances’.16 They pointed to the apathy of neighbouring 
governments in tackling the problem in refugees and 
criticised British pharmaceutical companies for stopping 
production of sleeping sickness drugs for use in the UK’s 
former colonies (L’Etang, 1975). At the request of the 
Sudanese government, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) therefore granted sleeping sickness 
control its own $81,000 budget line, with WHO expected to 
fund the difference and work out the details.17   
The WHO regional office supporting Sudan (the Eastern 
Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO)) responded 
quickly, drafting a comprehensive proposal incorporating 
state of the art serological and parasitological diagnostic 
technologies forecast to cost $193,000 over three years (see 
Table 1 outlining other elements of WHO plans).18  
10 ‘Agreement between the World Health Organisation 
and the  
Although ambitious, the plan stopped short of proposing 
elimination, which was no longer considered feasible.  
 
Government of Sudan for a trypanosomiasis control project’, 
1955, national archives Zande District SS file 1953-78, ZD  
96.B.1. 
11 K. R. S Morris (1962) ‘“Addendum” to “The relation of 
trypanosomiasis to agricultural, forestry, veterinary and other 
activities in the Sudan”, report to WHO Expert Committee on 
Trypanosomiasis, WHO archives, Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan. 
12 Pentamidisation was later discredited as having little 
protective effect against new infections and even inhibiting case-
detection efforts by masking parasitemia (Pepin and Labbe, 2008; 
Stanghellini, 1999). 
13 Forty-three and 20 cases were reported in the last two 
years of the programme from Yei and Tambura, respectively 
(Hutchinson, 1975, report to WHO).  
14 Hutchinson, 1975 report to WHO. 
15 Letter from M. Louise Pirouet to Roelsgaard (1972) and P. 
L. Giacometti (1973) ‘Assignment report: Public health advisory 
services in the Southern Sudan, communicable diseases, 20 
January–12 May 1973’, WHO archives, Trypano1-EMROSudan. 
16 Ibid. 
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17 R. Moltu to S. A. Abier (7 September 1972) ‘Unicef 
assistance to South Sudan’, national archives, High Executive 
Council, HEC.90.A.1. 
18 Regional Director EMRO to L. Bernard (1973) ‘Proposal for 
trypanosomiasis control project in Southern Sudan under FT 
arrangements financed by UNHCR’ and associated 
correspondence, WHO archives, SUD-MPD-005, 13/04/1973. 
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Table 1: Key elements of WHO’s post-war sleeping sickness 
reconstruction plans (1970s) 
 
1. Lab personnel training in: 
• Serological diagnostic methods (capillary haemagglutination, latex agglutination, immunofluorescence) 
• Parasitological diagnostic methods (identification of parasites in body fluids using simple microscopy and in 
buffy    coat isolated through centrifugation) 
• Animal inoculation and blood culture diagnostic methods 
 
2. Treatment at hospitals and field stations 
 
3. Establishment of mobile screening teams 
 
4. Pentamidine chemoprophylaxis campaigns 
 
5. Census of population at risk 
 
6. Entomological, socio-economic, epidemiological and cost–benefit studies 
 
7. Coordination with neighbouring country sleeping sickness programmes, liaison with WHO reference labs 
 
8. Design of long-term control programme 
 
Table legend: Information comes from plans and correspondence in the WHO Southern Sudan sleeping sickness file 1973–83. Not all control 
programme elements appeared in all WHO plans and individuals debated the appropriateness of particular elements (such as chemoprophylaxis) 
throughout the decade. 
The plan, however, never really materialised, despite visits 
by WHO personnel in 1973, 1974 and 1978, and the 
director of sleeping sickness at WHO headquarters 
personally redrafting it in 1976.19 Individuals within WHO 
were some of the most vocal critics of this failure; two 
European staff assigned to work on the programme in 
Maridi and Yambio eventually resigned in exasperation at 
‘administrative delays’.20 One of the main problems 
appeared to be the year-long wait at Port Sudan customs 
for lab equipment and supplies, which crippled screening 
and capacity-building activities.21 By 1978, sleeping 
sickness in Yambio had become so acute that one WHO 
staffer argued they could no longer wait for external 
assistance, highly trained personnel or a ‘magic screening 
formula’.22 In this case, the staffer recommended relying 
on only the simplest and swiftest techniques (mainly 
cervical lymph node puncture) which had already been 
proven during colonial and WHO pentamidisation 
campaigns. This recommendation furthermore fitted in 
with a new framing for sleeping sickness which WHO 
promoted through the 1980s  
around integration of control activities into primary 
healthcare structures,23 part of a wider institutional focus on 
rural primary healthcare (WHO, 1987). 
Others in Yambio were also critical of WHO’s seeming 
inability to mount a response. An international NGO 
working in Yambio, Caritas, for example, had been 
reporting cases to WHO since 1973. In the absence of the 
promised UN intervention, Caritas had resorted to 
borrowing sleeping sickness equipment and drugs from the 
Belgian Development Cooperation (BDC)’s bilateral 
programme in neighbouring Zaire (Akol, 1981). Belgian 
scientists brought in from Zaire were scathing of the WHO 
response, estimating that the delay had cost 3,000 new 
infections at a price of $1.2 million, which the Belgian 
government now had to fund (Akol, 1981).  
The Southern Regional Government, at least in the most 
affected areas, also found ways of making do without the 
technologies of the UN programme by returning to 
interventions known from the colonial period. Between 
1975 and 1977, at the request of  
 
19 Regional Director EMRO to P. de Raadt (19 February 1976) 
‘Revised plan of operation for a trypanosomiasis control project, 
Southern Sudan’, WHO archives, SUD-MPD-005. 
20 See Hutchinson’s 1974 and 1975 reports and various  
Yambio area chiefs, the Commissioner of Western 
Equatoria initiated a series of radical environmental and 
population control measures, framed as a national duty in 
the ‘War against Sleeping Sickness’.24  
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correspondence in 1975–76 in WHO archives, SUD-MPD-005; see 
also Binz’s 1975 and Lapeysonnie’s 1978 reports in WHO archives, 
Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan. 
21 L. Lapeyssonie (1974) ‘Report on a visit to Sudan: 3–30 
June 1974’ report to WHO-EMRO, WHO archives, SUD-MPD-
005. 
22 L. Lapeyssonie (1978) ‘Assignment report on human 
trypanosomiasis control in Southern Sudan: December 1977–
March 1978’, report to WHO, WHO archives, Trypano1-EMRO-
Sudan. 
 
23 Ibid.; see also WHO correspondence from 1983 with 
German primary health care programme in Equatoria, WHO 
archives, CTD/TRY T7/360/6.SUD. 
24 D. Tek to Inspector Local Government’s Office Zande 
District Yambio (30 November 1977), national archives, Zande 
District SS file, ZD 96.B.1. 
Strategies included financial penalties for people who 
did not attend inspections or absconded from treatment 
(when it was available), making it illegal for Zairean 
traders who could be infected to sell in Sudanese 
markets and compelling chiefs to clear tsetse habitat 
from streams and citizens to clear bushes from around 
their compounds. A sleeping sickness tax was levied to 
fund these efforts.25   
Reimagining and 
relegating fly control  
From this point on in Southern Sudan, WHO appears to 
have given up pursuing the idea of direct provision or 
financing of sleeping sickness services, as planned in the 
immediate post-war reconstruction period. Instead, the 
main activities it engaged in over the next decade were 
epidemiological and entomological assessments of 
sleeping sickness risk associated with development and 
humanitarian interventions. Investigations at Ture forest 
station near Kajo-Keji, a plantation in  
Maridi, a proposed cattle ranch at Loa and camps for 
Ugandan refugees near Nimule, for example, all paid 
considerable attention to how changes in the natural 
environment could influence transmission.26 A WHO 
entomologist deployed to the Belgian programme in the 
1980s furthermore sought to revisit and reimagine 
colonial tsetse control methods that could be applied 
there.27 In Tambura, the ‘blocks’ along rivers where 
tsetse habitat had been cleared in the late 1930s near the 
town were identified and recleared. Rather than 
recruiting boys to catch flies by hand, the entomologist 
designed a trial of insecticide-impregnated cloth targets 
to attract and kill flies – the first for control of G fuscipes 
in Africa.28 In Yambio, where resettlement or 
pentamidisation were previously the only control  
 
options considered, detailed entomological and human 
screening surveys suggested that most transmission occured 
at particular wells dug in the forest. Medical screening 
therefore incorporated a team of people on bicycles to erect 
and maintain fly targets around these specific hotspots.  
This disease control contribution by WHO was important 
given the Belgian programme’s restricted geographic focus 
to areas bordering Zaire (mainly Yambio and Tambura) and, 
particularly, their prioritisation of medical responses. Unlike 
in some West African settings, however, where tsetse 
trapping gained popularity because the French Office of 
Scientific and Technical Research Overseas (ORSTOM) 
promoted vector control as an alternative to coercive 
screening methods in the 1970s, trapping was not taken up 
in a major way here (Laveissiere and Penchenier, 2005). By 
and large, these WHO assessments and plans gave rise to 
little substantive non-medical activity (see Table 2), with 
vector control typically consigned to a supporting role. 
Entomological surveys, for example, were characterised in 
WHO reports as only useful to delimit an area needed for 
medical intervention or to increase its efficiency by 
decreasing the number of repeated population screenings 
needed to control disease.  
As the humanitarian crisis grew over the next decade, 
vector control fell even further out of favour. Although 
Merlin later led a trapping project in Tambura in 1997 
(Joya and Okoli, 2001, Moore and Richer, 2001), 
subsequent proposals to expand the programme to Yambio 
and Maridi went unfunded (interview with NGO staff, 
2006), reflecting uncertainty about the economics of vector 
control in humanitarian interventions across the continent 
(Trowbridge et al., 2001; Shaw, 2005). A  
25 By the time of another WHO visit in 1978, SDG 300 had 
been raised for this fund by leaders WHO staff 
characterised as ‘enthusiastic but inexperienced’ in 
sleeping sickness control (Lapeysonnie, 1978 report to 
WHO). WHO staff evidently felt responsible for offering 
guidance so that these funds would be spent efficiently, 
but further information on either the guidance offered or 
how these funds were eventually spent is unavailable. 
similar pattern seems to have prevailed in the 1980s,  
when UNHCR officials declined to fund a vector control 
programme requested by Ugandan refugees in Yei 
(Harrell-Bond, 1986: 58, 333). Moreover, environmental 
considerations and vector control recommendations are 
noticeably absent from any of the WHO sleeping 
sickness assessments that have taken place in the last 
three decades.29  
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26 See reports by Hutchinson (1975), Lapeyssonie (1978) 
and Snow (1983 and 1984) in WHO archives, SUD-MPD-005 
and Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan.  
27 Snow, 1984 report to WHO. 
28 Unfortunately, because records stop, it is unclear whether 
this planned trial took place. Merlin records, however, 
suggest that the fly-boys from the colonial period were 
rehired for a short period to teach hand-catching techniques. 
29 See, for example, reports by Ranque and Cattand (1995) 
to WHO in WHO archives, Trypano1-EMRO-Sudan; reports 
by Ruiz (2005) to Merlin and Postigo (2009) to WHO in the 
Merlin archive, as well as published assessments by Ruiz-
Postigo et al. (2012) and WHO (2004). 
Belgian medical tools in a 
humanitarian space (1978–
90) 
Throughout the 1980s, serodiagnosis and treatment was the 
mainstay of the BDC’s control strategy in Southern Sudan. 
Modern serodiagnostics, a category of simple agglutination 
assays which screen for antibodies associated with 
infection, rather than the parasite itself, and thus require no 
Table 2: Inter-war medical survey and vector control work recommended 
by WHO and implemented, by focus 
Sleeping sickness focus  Type of medical 
screening 
recommended  
Type of vector control 
recommended  
Activities successfully 
implemented (by 1990) 
Tambura As precautionary measure  
(1975)  
Exploratory survey (1975), 
depletion trapping (1983), 
habitat clearance around 
streams in towns and trial of 
screens (1984)  
Partial medical screening 
with CATT, some depletion 
trapping by fly boys 
Yambio  As emergency control 
measure (1975)   
Exploratory survey (1975), 
aerial spraying by 
helicopter (1978), depletion 
trapping (1983)  
Full medical screening with 
CATT, entomological 
surveys, study of water 
source-related infection 
risk, elaboration of new 
Yambio-specific vector 
control method focused on 
wells, sticky screens pilot 
Maridi  Exploratory (1975)  Depletion trapping (1983)  Partial medical screening 
via lymph node palpation 
Yei  As precautionary measure  
(1975)  
Exploratory survey  
(1975)  
 
Kajo-Keji     Exploratory survey  
(1983)  
Partial medical screening 
via lymph node palpation 
Juba area (incl Rokon,  
Loka, Sindiru)  
Exploratory (1983)  Exploratory survey (1983), 
aerial survey of tsetse 
habitat  
Partial medical screening 
via lymph node palpation. 
Nimule  Spot surveys (1975) and as 
precautionary measure  
(1984)   
Exploratory survey (1975,  
1984)  
 
Torit   Exploratory (1983)  Exploratory survey (1975,  
1983)  
Partial medical screening 
via lymph node palpation. 
Akobo  Spot surveys (1975)     
Table legend: Information comes from correspondence found in the WHO archive, particularly reports written by Hutchinson (1975), Lapeyssonie (1975 
and 1978) and Snow (1983 and 1984), as well as correspondence in the Belgian and Merlin project archives. 
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laborious microscopy, were introduced into routine practice 
in Southern Sudan in the early 1980s – before anywhere 
else in Africa. Ironically, although serodiagnosis was 
primarily developed by Belgian scientists in the 1970s 
(Magnus et al., 1978;  
Wery et al., 1970), it could not be used in formerly 
‘Belgian’ areas of Africa, namely Zaire/Congo, where 
the BDC had a large programme, until the mid-1990s 
because of ideological opposition (interview with 
former BDC staff, 2015). Since Zaire was the most 
endemic country in Africa, it also possessed the largest 
number of experts (both Congolese and Belgian), who 
were convinced through long experience that sleeping 
sickness could be most efficiently controlled through 
traditional microscopy. Deployment in the cross-border 
satellite Belgian programme in Sudan, however, 
allowed less experienced Belgian doctors, some of 
whom had recent training at the tropical medicine 
institute in Antwerp, to take up new innovations such as 
the serodiagnostic card agglutination test for 
trypanosomiasis (CATT test). The Sudan programme 
became a kind of haven for Belgians who did not fit into 
their own country’s programmatic culture in Zaire. 
Similarly, doctors from this programme reported some 
of the first field observations of today’s late stage 
sleeping sickness drugs, nifurtimox and eflornithine 
(Van Nieuwenhove et al., 1985; Van Nieuwenhove and 
Declercq, 1981).  
WHO global technical reports from this period suggest a 
reluctance to endorse these technologies for use in 
country programmes without wider validation 
(particularly of  the medicines (WHO, 1979, WHO, 
1986)). By 1983, however, the BDC’s demonstration of 
CATT test feasibility contributed to a change in global 
thinking To  WHO, the CATT test promised an even 
better entry-point than simple microscopy to attract a 
wider network of  actors into sleeping sickness control 
under a framework of integrated healthcare, and 
Southern Sudan was viewed  as politically stable enough 
to host such a pilot project. The re-emergence of conflict 
shortly afterwards, however,  appears to have moderated 
some of this enthusiasm (for  example, a proposed large-
scale bilateral German investment went unfunded). 
Rather, under BDC leadership and the support of a new 
national control programme office in Juba, staff in 
existing NGO-supported hospital-based programmes 
across the rest of Equatoria were trained and equipped to 
do passive detection and treatment, but only using 
simple microscopy. Even with BDC help, the logistics 
of using the CATT test in this new conflict setting were 
deemed too difficult.  
For individuals in the Sudanese government, the 
BDC’s use of unconventional technologies appears to 
have justified rare moments of programmatic 
regulation or interference in a collaboration which 
otherwise functioned effectively to win international 
support. In 1985, for example, the Ministry of 
International Health in Khartoum threatened to close 
the BDC programme upon discovering they were 
using unapproved medicines (which the Southern 
government condoned for compassionate reasons).30  
In contrast, a perceived unfairness in access to the 
BDC technologies was behind an investigation by the 
Southern government.31 In 1986, the Provincial  
 
Governor of Western Equatoria, reportedly tired of 
international organisations taking unilateral decisions, 
colluded with an ex-employee of the Belgian programme to 
embellish reports of a sleeping sickness outbreak in Maridi 
neighbouring the BDC programme to embarrass the 
Belgians and demand more attention from the government. 
A key finding of this investigation was popular demand for 
tsetse control. 
An emphasis on vector control, as well as expanded 
screening coverage of foci across the Equatoria region, was 
therefore among the objectives in the Southernsupported 
BDC’s proposal for a five-year extension of its programme 
in 1988.32 Development officials in Brussels, however, 
declined to renew the programme in a bid to consolidate the 
BDC’s sleeping sickness work in Zaire and Rwanda. For 
reasons never known to project leaders on the ground, the 
programme continued to receive unofficial support, and the 
centres in Yambio and Juba were able to keep basic medical 
screening activities going for another two and a half years 
until fighting reached project areas in December 1990 and 
the team evacuated to Zaire (interview with former BDC 
staff, 2015).  
Humanitarians and the new 
best practice (1990–2005) 
From 1986, MSF began to lead its own sleeping sickness 
interventions for displaced Southern Sudanese in Uganda. 
Individuals encountering sleeping sickness during this 
period felt themselves to be operating in a vacuum, without 
good tools or guidance on best practice (Corty, 2011; 
d’Alessandro, 2009). In one hospital, MSF staff 
systematically conducted lumbar punctures on patients to 
prove to themselves that the Belgian CATT test could be 
trusted (a practice known from, but not followed since, the 
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colonial period and contrary to longstanding WHO advice) 
(Interview with researcher associated with MSF 
programme, 2015). Eventually MSF engaged in a large 
global research and advocacy programme around medical 
innovations for sleeping sickness. Many of these (the 
CATT, eflornithine and nifurtimox) were being used in 
Southern Sudan, but on a small scale or informally.  
30 J. Vermer to Forman (13 November 1985), WHO 
archives,  
MSF emphasised transforming systems to support 
their use: validating tools in formal clinical trials  
 
T7-370-6SUD [translation]. 
31 C. Lado to Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
(1987) ‘Trip report to Western Equatoria, 17–27 Jan 1987’, 
Belgian Development Cooperation (BDC) archives. 
32 Anonymous (1988), ‘[Project fact sheet: sleeping 
sickness control project in Sudan]’, BDC archives. 
so that they could be endorsed by WHO and more easily 
accepted into national programmes, pressing 
manufacturers to commit to producing medicines and 
diagnostics at scale and establishing a strong, sustainable 
global logistics supply chain (Corty, 2011).  
Unlike during the war of the 1960s and 1970s, 
humanitarian organisations including MSF were 
eventually able to mount a robust response which far 
exceeded WHO’s 1995 proposal for a renewed network of 
basic integrated care providers.33 As we discuss elsewhere 
(Palmer et al., 2014), the need for complex tools and 
expertise to control sleeping sickness was one of the 
factors that attracted MSF to the disease. Through a 
programme of clinical and operational research, much of it 
carried out in Sudan itself (Chappuis, 2002, 2004; 
Balasagaram, 2006, 2009; Maina, 2006, 2007; Priotto, 
2008, 2012; Checchi, 2012), MSF developed a system of 
good practice adapted to the Sudanese context and others 
like it. Over time, MSF became the global thought-leader 
on what was considered most ethical in a humanitarian 
sleeping sickness response. By demonstrating this practice 
and sharing its tools, MSF drew in other actors to multiply 
and sustain the response, including international 
organisations such as Malteser (in Yei since 2002) and 
Merlin (in Tambura in 1997 and Nimule since 2005), 
which are still present in endemic areas today. From the 
early 2000s, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation 
Association (SRRA), the humanitarian arm of the 
Southern rebels, became involved in coordination. After 
the end of the war in 2005, the Neglected Tropical 
Diseases Directorate within the Ministry of Health was 
formed partially because of the need to coordinate such 
large-scale responses to sleeping sickness (interview with 
Ministry of Health, 2014). In contrast, the substantial 
expertise in tsetse control developed by Khartoumbased 
academics (e.g. Mohammed et al., 2010), was taken up by 
neither humanitarian actors during the civil war period nor 
the Southern government afterwards. 
As a medical organisation, it should not be surprising 
that MSF preferred a primarily medical approach to 
control, based on population screening and treatment. 
MSF has never strongly advocated a vector control 
approach to sleeping sickness (Corty, 2011), and many 
of the colonial-era approaches, such as  
 
forcible resettlement or the taxing of endemic areas to fund 
control, as advocated by Yambio chiefs in the 1970s, 
would be antithetical to its humanitarian principles. That 
said, when MSF first engaged in sleeping sickness control 
among refugees from Sudan in 1986, its response was 
strongly influenced by the work of a colonial French 
military doctor and Nobel Prize nominee, Eugene Jamot 
(ASNOM, 2001; Louis et al., 2002; Milleliri, 2004). 
Jamot’s systematic population screening strategy was a 
good fit with the organisational culture guiding MSF’s 
emergency medical interventions at this time, which 
sought to adapt innovations from emergency and military 
services (Vidal and Pinel, 2011). MSF’s understanding or 
assessment of local and continental sleeping sickness 
history was thus specific to its preferred way of working: 
Jamot had shown that sleeping sickness control was best 
done via mass screening and the epidemic MSF was 
seeing could be explained by war interrupting Belgian 
activities. More mass screening was thus the answer. This 
is important given that many of MSF’s norms related to 
sleeping sickness control have been adopted by others and 
persist beyond the acute conflict phase today (Palmer et 
al., 2014).  
Conclusion 
The tumultuous political history of Southern Sudan has 
meant that efforts to control sleeping sickness there have 
been both unique and uneven. Be it prophylactic 
injections, insecticide-treated targets, serodiagnostics or 
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new medicines, we have discussed many examples of 
how, in periods of both conflict and calm, Southern Sudan 
was seen as an ideal place to test new strategies because of 
the right combination of endemicity, infrastructure and 
willing actors. It is also a history that complicates in 
important ways the general story of sleeping sickness in 
Africa. For instance, a common narrative is that the post-
colonial period saw disengagement with sleeping sickness 
control on the part of post-independence African 
governments, largely because they disliked the coercive 
practices of colonial administrations (ASNOM, 2001; De 
Raadt, 2005; Pepin and Labbe, 2008; Laveissiere and 
Penchenier, 2005). Yet in the Southern Sudanese case, 
many of the more intrusive practices had been relaxed by 
the  
33 P. Ranque and P. Cattand travel report to WHO (1995). Several 
contemporary reviews of these interventions exist (Moore, 1999; 
Moore and Richer, 2001; Trowbridge et al., 2001; Pagey, 2003; 
Ruiz-Postigo et al., 2012; Ruiz et al., 2008). 
colonial authorities by the late 1930s: it was WHO-led 
ideas on how elimination should be pursued that led to 
the reintroduction of large-scale population restrictions. 
The contingencies of the first civil war meant that these 
measures could not be pursued at scale, but local 
government authorities nonetheless did what they could 
to continue these practices, particularly when neither the 
national government nor international organisations were 
present to respond to local sleeping sickness control 
needs. Punishment (of various kinds) for people who did 
not attend screenings (and their chiefs) continued until at 
least 1978. Even today, Zande chiefs in the Tambura area 
have the authority to impose fines on people who do not 
keep paths to their homes clean (Allen, 2007). 
As well as contributing to a more nuanced narrative of 
sleeping sickness in the twentieth century, the Southern 
Sudan case has implications for the ways in which we 
think about the capacities, blind spots and limitations of 
international humanitarian actors. If the main story, as 
we have argued, is the progressive medicalisation of the 
response to the epidemic, and the neglect of vector 
control, what are the assumptions that have underpinned 
that perspective? And what does this reveal about the 
nature of humanitarian intervention in Southern Sudan 
and elsewhere? We propose that there are three more 
general issues that demand further reflection: the pattern 
of successive actors taking control, an increasing 
exclusion of indigenous perspectives and knowledge and 
a preference for portable technologies. 
Firstly, the fact that the above narrative can be divided 
relatively straightforwardly into periods delineated by 
different dominant actors – the colonial era, the WHO 
era and so on – is itself revealing. The outbreak and 
cessation of war led to the involvement of different 
actors at different times, mostly notably with WHO most 
comfortable and capable of acting in times of calm, 
whilst MSF gained momentum – and spurred major 
innovations – in periods of conflict and crisis. As 
different actors came and went, interest was lost not only 
in vector control, but also in schemes which integrated 
disease control and agricultural development. If it is a 
truism that development and humanitarian actors often 
fail to adequately learn from historical examples (Davey 
et al., 2013; Porter et al., 1991), this is especially so 
when institutional turnover is so marked. It is, after all, 
harder to learn from the mistakes of others. 
This difficulty in securing long-term continuity of 
knowledge and planning is, ironically, at odds with 
discussions of the role of NGOs in Southern Sudan in 
other histories. Tvedt, for instance, argues that the 
long-term presence of international actors had  
a ‘crowding out’ effect as ‘NGOs unintentionally 
contributed to the erosion of the authority of a very weak 
state’ (Tvedt, 1998: 189). Others have expressed concern 
that the size and longstanding presence of aid would have a 
distorting effect, perhaps even contributing to a political 
economy of conflict (Duffield, 1993; Duffield, 2002; 
Macrae et al., 1997). Thus, whilst humanitarian actors 
tackling emergencies have sometimes been accused of 
causing problems by staying too long, the very different 
timescales involved in long-term disease control mean that 
even decadelong interventions end up being too short. 
Ultimately, this may be a limitation of any humanitarian aid: 
perhaps only nation states are fully capable of the 
multigenerational learning and planning necessary to 
comprehensively tackle complex diseases. 
A second revealing feature of this era is the extent to which 
methods of sleeping sickness control were determined 
predominantly according to external priorities, rather than 
sustained consideration of what had worked (or not) in the 
past. What is so striking about the progressive 
medicalisation of sleeping sickness control in Southern 
Sudan, is that, with all of the country’s attractiveness to test 
new innovations, the shift took place seemingly with very 
little circling back to examine strategy, or reconsideration of 
the benefits of alternative methods. The clearest example of 
   15 
this is WHO’s decision to use pentamidisation as a solution 
to the second Sudanese outbreak defined by actors on the 
ground as a problem of increased contact with tsetse 
because of cotton scheme resettlements. Then, when WHO 
re-entered a decade later, their approach to the third 
epidemic focused on laboratory capacity-building with 
seemingly little reflection on whether and why 
pentamidisation had failed, or whether tsetse control might 
be appropriate (see Table 3). In rare cases where actors did 
attempt to rethink their approach (for instance, at various 
points with WHO in the 1970s and 1980s, the Belgian 
Development Corporation in 1988 and the unfunded Merlin 
proposal in 1997), such dissenting perspectives 
conspicuously failed to find purchase. This seems all the 
more striking in comparison with, say, the vigorous and 
wide-ranging debates regarding HIV and Ebola control 
strategies. 
How can this seemingly single-minded pursuit of a narrow 
strategy be accounted for? We argue that it is related to the 
weakness of Southern Sudanese institutions. Whilst there 
have long been powerful actors in global health, social 
scientists have regularly highlighted the ability of African 
nations, professionals  
and publics to deflect and modify global agendas (for a 
theoretical framework see Ong and Collier (2005), and for 
recent examples see the essays in Geissler (2015)). 
However, Southern Sudan represents an extreme case given 
the prolonged and serious weaknesses of organised capacity 
to modify and resist programmes ‘from above’. In this 
sense, the chains of decisionmaking by international actors 
that we have described offer a glimpse of global health and 
humanitarian processes in their purest, least attenuated 
forms.  
                                                          
5 In the context of neglected disease, see for example (Rumunu et 
al., 2009; Ruiz et al., 2008;, and in the context of land tenure, see 
Badiey (2013). 
This relatively unchecked globalism is assisted, we argue, 
by a set of rhetorical moves that emphasise Southern Sudan 
as an ahistorical, unknowable space, one easily conceived of 
as a blank slate. For instance, in modern policy discussions 
it is often suggested that, whilst the limited institutions of 
the new South Sudan state are obviously a developmental 
weakness, this situation nonetheless provides an opportunity 
for addressing problems unencumbered by the inertia of pre-
existing bureaucracies and priorities.5 This trope (almost a 
cliché, such is the frequency with which it is repeated) may 
be true in certain circumstances, but was paradoxically also 
a view that was seemingly shared by past actors. By 
ignoring a long tradition of vector control-centric and 
integrated developmental approaches to sleeping sickness, 
actors reveal a tacit assumption that little significant prior 
work had been done, and that little relevant local knowledge 
or capacity existed. 
This reluctance to engage with (or simply ignorance of) the 
prior histories of disease control goes hand in hand with a 
third key trend – a marked preference for portable 
technologies that avoid political entanglements. By 
portable, we mean ‘humanitarian goods’ in the sense of 
both tangible products that provide relief or care of some 
kind (of which a serodiagnostic tool is a key example) or 
programmatic strategies (such as mobile teams with 
prophylactic pentamidine) that avoid the need to build 
systems and infrastructures. Like other humanitarian goods, 
such as nutritional food additives (Scott-Smith, 2013), 
diagnostic tools and mobile teams offer the prospect of a 
technical humanitarianism which need not engage with 
longer-term questions of planning, livelihoods and 
sustainability. As Peter Redfield has argued, MSF’s 
preference for standardised methods, kits and mobile teams 
‘represents a mobile, transitional variety of limited 
intervention, modifying and partially reconstructing a local 
Table 3: Sequence of theories about sleeping sickness outbreaks and the 
predominant  control strategies  
Outbreak  Theories about cause  Control measures taken 
1920s  
  
British: Spill-over from neighbouring countries  
  
British: Border control, isolation of communities and 
patients, tsetse habitat destruction, mass screening 
1950s  
  
British: Population resettlement to support  
agricultural scheme 
British: Mass screening with pentamidisation 
1970/80s  NGOs and WHO: Chaos of war and apathy   Local government: Tsetse habitat destruction 
  
  
of international actors   
  
WHO: Capacity-building for lab systems  
Belgians: Mass screening with new diagnostic 
1990/2000s  
  
NGOs and WHO: Interruption of Belgian  mass 
screening programme 
MSF: Mass screening with improved global support  
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environment around specific artefacts and a set script’ 
(Redfield, 2011: 281; emphasis added). Again, the shift 
from earlier broad approaches to screening and treatment 
represents both confidence in the power of improved 
diagnostics and drugs to tackle a problem, but also the 
reluctance of humanitarian actors to engage more broadly. 
In conclusion, we have argued that Southern Sudan has 
seen an unusual pattern of humanitarian activity in 
response to sleeping sickness. The progressive 
medicalisation we have described was not simply an 
inevitable outcome as technologies evolved – other major 
African disease control projects such as malaria, and 
indeed sleeping sickness elsewhere on the continent, 
have continued to emphasise environmental methods. 
Rather, the European-driven, medical and technocratic 
methodology we identify became progressively more 
entrenched in response to a particular set of 
circumstances and assumptions. The perception, accurate 
or otherwise, that Southern Sudan lacks a tradition of 
disease control and the presence of (or even medium-
term possibility for) health infrastructure has encouraged 
actors to focus on global tools over domestic systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Much has been achieved in controlling sleeping sickness 
in Southern Sudan, despite the very unpromising 
circumstances. We certainly hope this history does not 
read as a chastisement of successive generations of 
humanitarians who have acted with great courage and 
integrity. Instead, we argue that the unique 
circumstances of this case have rendered certain 
widespread trends in humanitarianism particularly 
legible, specifically the emergence of innovative tools 
and portable technologies which have the power to heal 
and care, but also a tendency to displace other 
approaches and perspectives. Future projects and 
research, we believe, must engage with history to 
explore more integrated approaches, in which 
transnational flows of expertise and resources can be 
more precisely calibrated towards the complex 
contingencies of local need. 
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